Euthyphro
or
On Holiness:
Select Commentary
February 22, 2019
Apprentice Jonathan
Is Pious pious 'cause God loves pious? Socrates asks, "Whose bias do y'all seek?”
Jay Z and Kanye West
introduction
Although there are moments of irony in Platonic dialogues, the abundance of ironical occasions in Euthyphro is atypical. For the purposes of this essay, irony is to be understood as “a literary technique ... by which the full significance of a character's words or actions are clear to the audience or reader although unknown to the character.” Although the novice reader of Plato can be challenged by both the length and topic of the dialogues, the ironic significance of an phrase, idea, or even a word, cannot be fully appreciated until the reader is sufficiently familiar with Plato’s works.
Euthyphro’s understanding of the world is through the medium of religion which is based on Divine revelation, which in turn, is based on a prophet who has received and propagated the revelation. In contrast to Euthyphro, Socrates attempts to understand the world, and the men who populate it, through human reasoning.
We rely mostly on the translation of Benjamin Jowett, as it is the most widely available version to the general reader. However, we have consulted with H.N. Fowler’s translation (1919) and, when we consider the later to offer clarity, we have substituted that text. Additionally, punctuation and dated phrasing has been modified for the benefit of the modern reader.
In 1551, Henri Estienne created the verse numbers for the New Testament and in 1578, he introduced a system of numbers and letters that are found universally for academic citations of Plato. As the references are to the Greek text, we have placed the references at the end of the translated sentence and we are confident this placement will not create difficulty for the Gentle Reader. Plato’s works are in three volumes and the first dialogue of the first volume is Euthyphro or On Holiness, while the Republic occupies the middle of the second volume. As Plato noted in the Republic “The unexamined life is not worth living.”
Euthyphro’s understanding of the world is through the medium of religion which is based on Divine revelation, which in turn, is based on a prophet who has received and propagated the revelation. In contrast to Euthyphro, Socrates attempts to understand the world, and the men who populate it, through human reasoning.
We rely mostly on the translation of Benjamin Jowett, as it is the most widely available version to the general reader. However, we have consulted with H.N. Fowler’s translation (1919) and, when we consider the later to offer clarity, we have substituted that text. Additionally, punctuation and dated phrasing has been modified for the benefit of the modern reader.
In 1551, Henri Estienne created the verse numbers for the New Testament and in 1578, he introduced a system of numbers and letters that are found universally for academic citations of Plato. As the references are to the Greek text, we have placed the references at the end of the translated sentence and we are confident this placement will not create difficulty for the Gentle Reader. Plato’s works are in three volumes and the first dialogue of the first volume is Euthyphro or On Holiness, while the Republic occupies the middle of the second volume. As Plato noted in the Republic “The unexamined life is not worth living.”
1-5
Scene
The Porch of the King Archon.
The Porch of the King Archon.
Euthyphro: Why have you left the Lyceum, Socrates? What are you doing in the Porch of the King Archon? Surely you cannot be concerned in a suit before the King, like myself?
Socrates: Not in a suit, Euthyphro; impeachment is the word which the Athenians use.
Euthyphro is unfamiliar with technical legal terms used in Athens which suggests his limited personal experiences and foreshadows his awkward conversation with Socrates.
Euthyphro: What! I suppose that someone has been prosecuting you, for I cannot believe that you are the prosecutor of another. [2b]
Socrates: Certainly not.
Philosophically minded individuals do not impose their views on others- reason prevails over force. On the contrary, if they converse with a gentlemen who cannot change his opinions, thereby indicating that his actions are not guided by reason, but by tradition, then philosophers are content to allow him to continue in his opinions.
Euthyphro: Then someone else has been prosecuting you?
Socrates: Yes.
Political philosophers are a persecuted group, whereas philosophers who leave the city to contemplate the nature of the universe remain unknown to the city and, as a consequence of their anonymity, are neither misunderstood nor mistreated.
Euthyphro: And who is he?
Socrates: A young man who is little known and I hardly know him. His name is Meletus and he is of the deme of Pitthis. Perhaps you may remember his appearance, he has a beak, long straight hair, and a beard which is ill grown.
Euthyphro: No, I do not remember him, but what is the charge which he brings against you?
Socrates: What is the charge? Well, a very serious charge, which shows a good deal of character in the young man and for which he is certainly not to be despised.
One’s character, or “the mental and moral qualities distinctive to an individual”, are manifested by actions or behavior. Hence, Meletus’ charge against Socrates is indicative of Meletus’ moral beliefs. It is explicitly stated that Meletus is not to be despised for his character. However, it is possible to understand the ambiguous wording so that Meletus can be despised for his lack of reasoning, his reliance upon traditions and opinions, and his persecution of Socrates.
He says he knows how the youth are corrupted and who are their corruptors. I fancy that he must be a wise man and seeing that I am the reverse of a wise man, he has found me out and is going to accuse me of corrupting his young friends.
Socrates declares he is not a wise man, for he maintains throughout the dialogues that he “knows nothing.” Socrates was able to corrupt some “young friends” of Meletus, but not Meletus. We suggest that Meletus, unlike his friends, holds certain opinions that are impervious to proper reasoning and careful consideration.
6-10
And of this our mother the state is to be the judge. Of all our political men, he is the only one who seems to me to begin in the right way, with the cultivation of virtue in youth. Like a good husbandman, he makes the young shoots his first care and clears away us who are the destroyers of them. This is only the first step. He will afterwards attend to the elder branches and if he goes on as he has begun, he will be a very great public benefactor.
Philosophers are not benefactors to either the state or to individuals. The nature of the philosopher is to ponder the “things below the earth” and “the heavens”, while the political philosopher examines “things on the earth”. If philosophers benefit others, then it is due entirely to the character of the philosopher and his need to engage in conversations with young men and gentlemen. Any benefit received by individuals is incidental to the natural curiosity of the philosopher.
Euthyphro: I hope that he may, but I rather fear that the opposite will turn out to be the truth. My opinion is that in attacking you he is simply aiming a blow at the foundation of the state. But in what way does he say that you corrupt the young? [3b]
Euthyphro equates Socrates with the “foundation of the state”. This false equivalent indicates Euthyphro’s ignorance concerning the factual basis of the city. Of course, Socrates’ endless questions, if correctly answered and fully appreciated by the masses, and not only by a handful of young men who like to think, would undermine the foundation of the state. Euthyphro is unaware of the conflict between Jerusalem and Athens, between revealed religion and received opinions that unite the state and the free inquiry of philosophy that questions all things, including tradition, that exposes the unfounded beliefs that unites the citizens.
Socrates: He brings a wonderful accusation against me, which at first hearing excites surprise. He says that I am a poet or maker of gods, and that I invent new gods and deny the existence of old ones. This is the ground of his indictment.
The word “poet” is to be understood both as an example of a Platonic technical term and as synonymous with “maker of gods”. The accusation of denying the old gods and inventing new gods is explored during Socrates' trial. Briefly, the solitary evidence for the “old gods” are only found in poetical writings, therefore, it is reasonable to doubt the gods’ existence and, by extension, their activities. By default, the “new gods” are those rare individuals who successfully pursue the philosophic life. ]
Euthyphro: I understand. He means to attack you about the familiar sign which occasionally, as you say, comes to you.
The “familiar sign” is a voice telling Socrates to avoid a specific action; this voice never tells or suggests to Socrates to engage in any activity. It is possible that Euthyphro doubts that Socrates has recourse to supernatural advice, since the wording used is “as you say”, indicating that Euthyphro understands the guidance is subjective. However, Euthyphro is unable to relate that his knowledge of the gods is also subjective.
He thinks that you are a neologian and he is going to have you up before the court for this. He knows that such a charge is readily received by the world, as I myself know too well. For when I speak in the assembly about divine things and foretell the future to them, they laugh at me and think me a madman. [3c]
The world is ever ready to believe accusations against individuals who adopt or uphold novel views, as the majority find comfort in established customs or traditions.
11-15
Yet, every word that I say is true. But they are jealous of us all and we must be brave and go at them.
Euthyphro believes every word he says is “true” and that the world is “jealous” both of God-fearing individuals and of philosophers. Euthyphro also believes that he and Socrates must “go at them” which is a contradiction to Euthyphro's earlier statement that he “cannot believe that” Socrates is “the prosecutor of another.”
Socrates: Their laughter is not a matter of much consequence. For a man may be thought wise, but the Athenians, I suspect, do not much trouble themselves about him until he begins to impart his wisdom to others, and then for some reason or other, perhaps, as you say, from jealousy, they are angry.
The citizens anger results from philosopher’s questions that lack emotionally satisfying answers and these unrelenting questions undermine the opinions that are the foundation of the state. While all states claim their existence to Divine intervention or to heroic mythology, the fact is that all states are founded upon a crime.
Euthyphro: I am never likely to try their temper in this way.
Socrates: I dare say not. For you are reserved in your behaviour and seldom impart your wisdom.
Euthyphro is “never likely: to try the Athenians’ temper, since he is not thought to be wise by those in the assembly. Euthyphro is reserved, yet he goes “at them” who do not accept his divinely inspired words and righteous deeds. Socrates states that Euthyphro seldom communicates his “wisdom”, which is due to this “wisdom” being opinions only. The lack of relating his opinions is attributed to his reserved behavior, not to the more likely possibility that no one in the assembly has any concern for Euthyphro’s opinions, religious or otherwise.
But I have a benevolent habit of pouring out myself to everybody, and would even pay for a listener, and I am afraid that the Athenians may think me too talkative.
Socrates claim that his habit of conversation is “well meaning and kindly”, although it corrupts the rare youth who likes to think by questioning opinions and denying the gods and provokes men who have long held opinions to anger.
Now if, as I was saying, they would only laugh at me, as you say that they laugh at you, the time might pass gaily enough in the court, but perhaps they may be in earnest and then what the end will be you soothsayers only can predict.
People laugh at the religiously outspoken, but persecute philosophers. From this dialogue we conclude that religious views and behavior, even if extreme, are not detrimental to uniting the city. However, philosophical questioning is dangerous as it undermines the city. Socrates identifies Euthyphro as one of the “soothsayers” who can “foretell the future” .
16-20
Euthyphro: I dare say the affair will end in nothing and you will win your cause and I think I shall win my own.
Euthyphro predicts the indictment against Socrates will end in “nothing” and incorrectly predicts, or rather guesses, that Socrates will win. “Nothing” is what death is considered to be by the philosopher.]
Socrates: And what is your suit? Are you the pursuer or the defendant?
Euthyphro: I am the pursuer.
Socrates: Of whom? [4a]
Euthyphro: You will think me mad when I tell you.
Socrates: Why? Has the fugitive wings?
Socrates’ inquiry can be understood either as suggesting either the defendant is a bird or a mythical being. In either possibility, the imagined courtroom proceeding is comical: Euthyphro bringing a caged bird to court or accusing an imaginary creature. Both scenarios would be insane, but not beyond the realm of possibility for those religiously motivated individuals.]
Euthyphro: Nay, he is not very volatile at his time of life.
Socrates: Who is he?
Euthyphro: My father.
Socrates: Your father! My good man?
Euthyphro: Yes.
Socrates: And of what is he accused?
Euthyphro: Of murder.
Socrates: By the powers! How little does the common herd know of the nature of right and truth. A man must be an extraordinary man and have made great strides in wisdom, before he could have seen his way to bring such an action.
Euthyphro: Indeed, he must.
Socrates makes a factual statement that the majority does not know the nature of “right and truth”, as they rely upon opinion and convention or the manner in “which something is usually done, especially within a particular area”. Euthyphro does not identify himself with “the common herd” and understands himself to be “an extraordinary man” who has made “great strides in wisdom”. Euthyphro lives an “unexamined life”.
Socrates: I suppose that the man whom your father murdered was one of your relatives. Clearly he was. For if he had been a stranger, you would never have thought of prosecuting him.
Euthyphro: I am amused at your making a distinction between one who is a relation and one who is not a relation. For surely the pollution is the same in either case, if you knowingly associate with the murderer, when you ought to clear yourself by proceeding against him.
Euthyphro statements demonstrate the commonly held idea of “guilt by association”, since he indicates the importance of clearing one’s name publicly. The appearance of public opinion overrides the reality of the facts of the matter. Neither Jesus, who ate with tax collectors and associated with prostitutes, nor Socrates were concerned about public opinion. The irony is that public opinion condemned both Jesus and Socrates to death.
The real question is whether the murdered man has been justly slain. If justly, then your duty is to let the matter alone; but if unjustly, then even if the murderer lives under the same roof with you and eats at the same table, proceed against him.
Euthyphro brings up the topic of justice (“justly slain”). Identifying what constitutes justice is the explicit reason entirety of the Republic.
21-25
Now the man who is dead was a poor dependent of mine who worked for us as a field labourer on our farm in Naxos and one day in a fit of drunken passion he got into a quarrel with one of our domestic servants and slew him. My father bound him hand and foot and threw him into a ditch and then sent to Athens to ask of a diviner what he should do with him.
An implication is that the father is religiously inclined, as he sought the advice of a “diviner”, yet he threw the bound man into a ditch.
Meanwhile, he never attended to him and took no care about him, for he regarded him as a murderer and thought that no great harm would be done even if he did die. Now this was just what happened. For such was the effect of cold and hunger and chains upon him, that before the messenger returned from the diviner, he was dead.
Although Euthyphro's father sought advice from a diviner, the father was indifferent to the man’s fate, demonstrated no concern for his welfare, and allowed him to die. This indifferent was shared by Euthyphro, who was also indifferent towards the wellbeing of his “poor dependent”.
And my father and family are angry with me for taking the part of the murderer and prosecuting my father. They say that he did not kill him and that if he did, the dead man was but a murderer and I ought not to take any notice, for a son who prosecutes a father is impious, which shows how little they know what the gods think about piety and impiety.
Euthyphro has an opinion regarding what the “gods think about piety and impiety” which is different from his family. We suggest that he is concerned with public opinion because the public is superior numerically than members of his family. This suggests that Euthyphro believes that truth is found in the largest group, indicating he has no regard for either facts or reasoning.
Socrates: Good heavens! Is your knowledge of religion and of things pious and impious so very exact, that, supposing the circumstances to be as you state them, you are not afraid lest you too may be doing an impious thing in bringing an action against your father?
Socrates questions Euthyphro’s understanding both of impiety and the exact circumstances of the story. The issue regarding this story is that facts may be exactly as described, but that other facts may be unknown, such as the murder may have been in self defense. From the evidence provided, neither Euthyphro nor the reader can know for certain if the murder was justified.
Euthyphro: The best of myself, and that which distinguishes me from other men, is my exact knowledge of all such matters. What should I be good for without it?
Typical of religious zealots, Euthyphro claims his “exact knowledge” of piety and impiety. Euthyphro believes that without this knowledge, which is not knowledge or “the theoretical or practical understanding of a subject”, but are only opinions, either received by Euthyphro or created by himself, he would be good for nothing.
26-30
Socrates: Rare friend! I think that I cannot do better than be your disciple.
Socrates indulges Euthyphro's high opinion of himself by wanting to be his student.
Then before the trial with Meletus comes on, I shall challenge him and say that I have always had a great interest in religious questions and now, as he charges me with rash imaginations and innovations in religion, I have become your disciple.
As a philosopher, we are certain that Socrates always had an interest in religious questions, as religion supposedly has definite answers to many questions. Socrates, the philosopher, can be charged with innovations, but rarely are soothsayers so charged, as they have been called by the gods themselves and, as such, they, their associates, and followers are largely immune to manifestations of disapproval. The appeal to the authority of another, in this case to Euthyphro, is typical behavior for the masses. However, for the philosopher, the only valid appeal is to one’s proper reasoning, not to external opinions or to widely recognized authorities.
As I shall say to him, "You, Meletus, acknowledge Euthyphro to be a great theologian and sound in his opinions and if you approve of him, you ought to approve of me and not have me into court, but if you disapprove, you should begin by indicting him who is my teacher and who will be the ruin, not of the young, but of the old, of myself, whom he instructs, and of his old father, whom he admonishes and chastises." If Meletus refuses to listen to me and will not shift the indictment from me to you, I cannot do better than repeat this challenge in the court.
Socrates states that by becoming a student of Euthyphro, this action will negate any need of a trial, due to Euthyphro's status as a “great theologian”. If Socrates’ ruse does not work, then Meletus must prosecute Euthyphro, since he has instructed Socrates. Of course, Socrates became a student of Euthyphro after the charge was filed. The legal theory would be that the defendant was guilty of a crime, but he later repented and, due to his repentance, it is no longer necessary to punish him.
Euthyphro: Yes, indeed and if he attempts to indict me, I am mistaken if I do not find a flaw in him. The court shall have a great deal more to say to him than to me.
Euthyphro firmly believes that due to this knowledge of divine things, his behavior is morally superior to most people, including Meletus, and that the court will recognize Euthyphro’s moral superiority and focus on Meletus’ supposed flaws.
Socrates: And knowing this, I am desirous of becoming your disciple. For I observe that no one appears to notice you, not even Meletus, but his sharp eyes have found me out at once and he has indicted me for impiety.
Socrates states that no one notices the “great theologian” Euthyphro, not even Meletus.
31-35
Therefore, I adjure you to tell me the nature of piety and impiety, which you said that you knew so well, and of murder and of other offences against the gods. [5d] What are they? Is not piety in every action always the same? And impiety, is it not always the opposite of piety, and also the same with itself, having, as impiety, one notion which includes whatever is impious?
Euthyphro: To be sure.
Euthyphro agrees that “impiety” is “always the opposite of piety”.
Socrates: And what is piety and what is impiety?
Euthyphro: Piety is doing as I am doing, that is to say, prosecuting any one who is guilty of murder, sacrilege, or of any similar crime- whether he be your father or mother or whoever he may be- that makes no difference; and not to prosecute them is impiety. [5e]
The religiously inclined Euthyphro includes the crime of sacrilege, or a ”violation of what is regarded as sacred”, with murder. Euthoprhyo confounds a subjective act, sacrilege, with an objective action, murder.
And please to consider what a notable proof I will give you of the truth of my words, a proof which I have already given to others: -of the principle that the impious, whoever he may be, ought not to go unpunished.
For do not men regard Zeus as the best and most righteous of the gods? And yet they admit that he bound his father (Cronos) because he wickedly devoured his sons, and that he too had punished his own father (Uranus) for a similar reason, in a nameless manner. [6a]
The proof Euthyphro offers is two accounts of the gods. The “nameless manner” of punishment is Cronos’ castration of Uranus.
Yet when I proceed against my father, they are angry with me. They are inconsistent in their way of talking when the gods are concerned, and when I am concerned.
Euthyphro understands the narrative of the gods as a pattern for human conduct, generally, and for his course of action, specifically. The uncritical Euthyphro recognizes the inconsistency in men’s reasoning, but not in his own arbitrary conclusions.
Socrates: May not this be the reason why I am charged with impiety? Because when people tell such stories about the gods, I find it hard to accept them? Therefore, I suppose that people think me wrong. But, as you who are well informed about them approve of them, I cannot do better than assent to your superior wisdom. [6b]
Socrates acknowledges that Euthyphro is well informed about the stories of the gods and, more importantly for the dialogue, approves of these stories. Of course, we cannot know if the stories are true or simply the creations of unknown poets. The wording of “superior wisdom” describes Euthyphro’s opinions.
36-40
What else can I say, confessing as I do, that I know nothing about them? Tell me, for the love of Zeus, whether you really believe that they are true.
Euthyphro: Yes and things more wonderful still, of which the world is in ignorance.
Socrates: And do you really believe that the gods fought with one another, had dire quarrels, battles, and the like, as the poets say, and as you may see represented in the works of great artists? [6c] The temples are full of them and notably the robe of Athene, which is carried up to the Acropolis at the great Panathenaea, is embroidered with them. Are all these tales of the gods true?
Although Socrates professes ignorance of the gods, he is familiar with their adventures.
Euthyphro: Yes, and as I was saying, I can tell you, if you would like to hear them, many other things about the gods which would quite amaze you.
Euthyphro believes that the stories of the gods are true and is willing to tell Socrates more amazing stories. Euthyphro's affirmative answer confirms that he lacks critical thinking and accepts stories, whether written or oral, at face value.]
Socrates: I dare say and you shall tell me them at some other time when I have leisure. But at present, I would rather hear a more precise answer, which you have not as yet given, to the question “What is piety?” [6d] When asked, you only replied, Doing as you do, charging your father with murder.
Euthyphro: And what I said was true.
Socrates: No doubt, but you would admit that there are many other pious acts?
Euthyphro: There are.
Socrates: Remember that I did not ask you to give me two or three examples of piety, but to explain the general idea which makes all pious things to be pious. Do you not recollect that there was one idea which made the impious impious, and the pious pious? [6e]
In the first book of the Republic, examples of justice are given, whereas Socrates overthrows these examples by asking questions and offering different circumstances for the same facts. Therefore, Socrates is consistent among the dialogues: he does not want examples, he desires definitions from those who claim to be intimately knowledgeable regarding the topic of choice.
Euthyphro: I remember.
Socrates: Tell me what is the nature of this idea and then I shall have a standard to which I may look and by which I may measure actions, whether yours or those of any one else, and then I shall be able to say that such and such an action is pious, such another impious.
Socrates seeks a standard so that he may know if actions are pious or impious.]
Euthyphro: I will tell you, if you like.
Socrates: I should very much like.
Socrates would like Euthyphro to provide a standard for piety.
41-45
Euthyphro: Piety is that which is dear to the gods and impiety is that which is not dear to them. [7a]
Socrates: Very good. You have now given me the sort of answer which I wanted.
The answer provides a standard: piety is “what is dear to the gods” and impiety is “that which is not dear” to the gods.
But whether what you say is true or not, I cannot as yet tell, although I make no doubt that you will prove the truth of your words.
Euthyphro has given two definitions, but Socrates is unsure if these definitions are true. Socrates does not ask for evidence, which can be found in stories, but for proof. As always, evidence found in stories should be understood as “poor evidence”. Of course, Socrates doubts that Euthyphro can offer proof.
Euthyphro: Of course.
Socrates: Come and let us examine what we are saying. A thing or person which is dear to the gods is pious and a thing or person which is hateful to the gods is impious. These two being the extreme opposites of one another. Was not that said?
Euthyphro: It was.
Socrates: And well said?
Euthyphro: Yes, I thought so. It was certainly said.
Socrates: And further, the gods were admitted to have enmities, hatreds, and differences?
Euthyphro: Yes, that was also said.
Socrates: And what sort of difference creates enmity and anger? Suppose, for example, you and I differ about a number. Do differences of this sort make us enemies and set us at variance with one another? Do we not go at once to arithmetic and put an end to them by a sum?
Euthyphro: True.
Socrates provides an example found in reality.
Socrates: Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes. Do we not quickly end the differences by measuring?
Euthyphro: Very true.
Socrates provides a second case found in the physical realm.
Socrates: And we end a controversy about heavy and light by resorting to a weighing machine?
Euthyphro: To be sure.
Socrates offers a third instance found in Nature.
46-50
Socrates: But what differences are there which cannot be decided? And which make us angry and set us at enmity with one another? I dare say the answer does not occur to you at the moment. Therefore, I suggest that these enmities arise when the matters of difference are the just and unjust, good and evil, honorable and dishonorable. [7d]
Socrates realizes Euthyphro has never thought about this line of inquiry (“the answer does not occur to you at the moment”). The soluble examples that Socrates provides are found in physical existence- numbers, sizes, and weights- whereas “enmities arise when the matters of difference” are of human creation, that is, of convention or “based on what is generally believed.”
Are not these the points about which men differ? And about which when we are unable satisfactorily to decide our differences, when we do quarrel?
Euthyphro: Yes, the nature of the differences about which we quarrel is as you describe.
Socrates: And the quarrels of the gods when they occur are of a like nature?
Euthyphro: Certainly they are.
Socrates: They have differences of opinion, as you say, about good and evil, just and unjust, honorable and dishonorable. There would have been no quarrels among them if there had been no such differences, would there now?
Euthyphro: You are quite right.
Socrates: Does not every man love that which he deems noble, just, and good, and hate the opposite of them?
Euthyphro: Very true.
The terms noble, just, and good are not defined.
Socrates: But, as you say, people regard the same things, some as just and others as unjust, -about these they dispute, and so there arise wars and fightings among them.
Euthyphro: Very true.
Socrates: Then the same things are hated by the gods and loved by the gods and are both hateful and dear to them?
Euthyphro: True.
Socrates: And upon this view the same things will be pious and also impious?
Euthyphro: So I should suppose.
Socrates draws the parallel between men’s opinions of what is good and evil and the gods’ opinions of what is piety and impiety. Due to conflicting opinions, the result is than an action can be both pious and impious. As always, a contradiction indicates an error in reasoning.
Socrates: Then I remark with surprise that you have not answered the question which I asked. For I did not ask you to tell me what action is both pious and impious, but now it would seem that what is loved by the gods is also hated by them.
Based on Euthyphro’s understanding, certain actions are “both pious and impious”. Since piety and impiety are opposites, they cannot be found in the same action. This contradiction is explicitly stated by Socrates as “what is loved by the gods is also hated by them.’
And therefore,, in chastising your father you may likely be doing what is agreeable to Zeus, but disagreeable to Cronos or Uranus, and what is acceptable to Hephaestus, but unacceptable to Hera. There may be other gods who have similar differences of opinion. [8b]
Euthyphro: But I believe that all the gods would be agreed as to the propriety of punishing a murderer. There would be no difference of opinion about that.
Euthyphro does not acknowledge the validity of Socrates observation that the gods “have differences of opinion”, but suggests that all the gods agree that a murder should be punished. Euthyphro does not offer any examples, evidence, or proofs of his opinion that he shares with the gods and we note how Euthyphro’s opinion concerning murder are identical to the gods’ opinions.
51-55
Socrates: Well, but speaking of men, did you ever hear anyone arguing that a murderer, or any sort of evil-doer, ought to be let off?
Euthyphro: I should rather say that these are the questions which they are always arguing, especially in courts of law. They commit all sorts of crimes and there is nothing which they will not do or say in their own defense.
Euthyphro acknowledges that defendants plead innocence, as innocent individuals are not punished, but those found guilty are punished.
Socrates: But do they admit their guilt and yet say that they ought not to be punished?
Euthyphro: No, they do not.
Everyone, including the defendants, acknowledge that the guilty should be punished, hence their claims of innocence. Later in the dialogue, Socrates suggests he will admit his guilt to Meletus, but he is now a disciple of Euthyphro, and should not be punished for past offenses.
Socrates: Then there are some things which they do not venture to say and do. For they do not venture to argue that the guilty are to be unpunished, but they deny their guilt, do they not? [8d]
Euthyphro: Yes.
Socrates: Then they do not argue that the evil-doer should not be punished, but they argue about the fact of who the evil-doer is, what he did, and when?
Euthyphro: True.
The reader should recall the incidents between Euthyphro’s father and the servant and between the two servants when attempting to determine “who the evil-doer is” and “what he did”, that is, the facts.
Socrates: And the gods are in the same case. If, as you assert, they quarrel about just and unjust, and some of them say, while others deny, that injustice is done among them. For surely, neither God nor man will ever venture to say that the doer of injustice is not to be punished?
Euthyphro: That is true in the main.
Socrates uses the conditional word “if”. An assertion is a “forceful statement of fact or belief” and, of course, a forceful statement does no increase the likelihood of its validity.
Socrates: But they join issue about the particulars- gods and men alike. And, if they dispute at all, they dispute about some act which is called in question and which by some is affirmed to be just, by others to be unjust. Is not that true?
Euthyphro: Quite true.
Socrates: Well,then do tell me for my better instruction and information, what proof have you that, in the opinion of all the gods, a servant who is guilty of murder and is put in chains by the master of the dead man and dies, because he is put in chains before he who bound him can learn from the interpreters of the gods what he ought to do with him, dies unjustly. [9a] And that on behalf of such, a son ought to proceed against his father and accuse him of murder. How would you show that all the gods absolutely agree in approving of his act?[9b] Prove to me that they do, and I will applaud your wisdom as long as I live.
Euthyphro: It will be a difficult task, but I could make the matter very clear indeed to you.
Euthyphro will attempt to prove that all the gods agree with Euthyphro’s prosecution of his father.
56-60
Socrates: I understand. You mean to say that I am not so quick of apprehension as the judges. For you will be sure to prove to them that the act is unjust, and hateful to the gods.
Euthyphro: Yes indeed, at least if they will listen to me.
Since the judges have similar opinions concerning the gods and justice, they will agree with Euthyphro, provided that they would listen to him.
Socrates: But they will be sure to listen, if they find that you are a good speaker.
Socrates suggests that Euthyphro is not a good speaker. The evidence for this suggestion is his inability to communicate to Socrates what is the standard of piety.
There was a notion that came into my mind while you were speaking. I said to myself: [9c]
"Well, what if he does prove to me that all the gods regarded the death of the serf as unjust, how do I know anything more of the nature of piety and impiety? For granting that this action may be hateful to the gods, still piety and impiety are not adequately defined by these distinctions. For that which is hateful to the gods has been shown to be also pleasing and dear to them."
Therefore, I do not ask you to prove this. If you like, I will suppose that all the gods condemn and abominate such an action. But I will amend the definition so far as to say that what all the gods hate is impious and what they love pious or holy and what some of them love and others hate is both or neither. Shall this be our definition of piety and impiety?
Euthyphro: Why not?
Socrates: Why not! Certainly, as far as I am concerned there is no reason why not. But whether this admission will greatly assist you in the task of instructing me as you promised, is a matter for you to consider.
Since Euthyphro is unaware, it is unlikely that Socrates’ assistance will ultimately be helpful to Euthyphro.
Euthyphro: Yes. I should say that what all the gods love is pious and holy and the opposite which they all hate, impious.
Socrates: Ought we to inquire into the truth of this, or simply to accept the mere statement on our own authority and that of others? What do you say?
Euthyphro: We should inquire and I believe that the statement will stand the test of inquiry.
The acceptance of authority, is the standard of the masses, otherwise said, the authority “of others”.
Socrates: We shall know better in a little while. [10a] The point which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious, or holy, is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods.
Euthyphro: I do not understand your meaning, Socrates.
Socrates: I will endeavor to explain. We speak of being carried and of carrying, of being led and of leading, of being seen and of seeing. You know that in all such cases there is a difference and you know also in what the difference lies?
Once again, Socrates takes a subjective topic, being “holy”, and uses physical examples, (carrying, leading, and seeing) to clarify what is meant by the term “holy”.
61-65
Euthyphro: I think that I understand.
Socrates: And is not that which is beloved distinct from that which loves?
Euthyphro: Certainly.
The “beloved” receives love and there is a distinction between "something being loved" and of a "something loving" or offering love.
Socrates: Now tell me: Is that which is carried in this state of carrying because it is carried, or for some other reason? [10b]
Euthyphro: No, that is the reason.
Socrates: And the same is true of what is led and of what is seen?
Euthyphro: True.
Socrates: And a thing is not seen because it is visible, but conversely, visible because it is seen. Nor is a thing led because it is in the state of being led or carried because it is in the state of being carried, but the converse of this. And now I think that my meaning will be intelligible and my meaning is that any state of action, or passion, implies previous action or passion. [10c]
It does not become, because it is becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes. Neither does it suffer because it is in a state of suffering, but it is in a state of suffering. because it suffers. Do you not agree?
Euthyphro: Yes.
Socrates is saying that if anything becomes or undergoes, it does not ‘become’ since it is in a state of becoming, but it is in a state of becoming since it becomes. Furthermore, it does not undergo because it is a thing which undergoes, but because it undergoes, it is a thing which undergoes.
Socrates: Is not that which is beloved a thing which is either becoming or undergoing something?
Euthyphro: Yes.
Socrates: And is this case like the former ones: those who love it, do not love it because it is a bad thing, but it is a beloved thing due to the fact they love it?
Euthyphro: Certainly.
Socrates: And what do you say of piety? Is not piety, according to your definition, loved by all the gods? [10d]
Euthyphro: Yes.
Socrates: Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason?
Euthyphro: No, that is the reason.
Socrates: It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?
Euthyphro: Yes.
Socrates: And that which is dear to the gods is loved by them and is in a state to be loved of them, because it is loved of them? [10e]
Euthyphro: Certainly.
Socrates: Then that which is dear to the gods is not holy, nor is that which is holy loved of God as you affirm, but they are two different things.
Euthyphro: How do you mean, Socrates?
Socrates: I mean to say that the holy has been acknowledged by us to be loved of God because it is holy, not to be holy because it is loved.
Euthyphro: Yes.
What is holy was holy before it was loved by God. Holy did not become holy due to God loving it.
Socrates: But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them because it is loved by them, not loved by them because it is dear to them.
Euthyphro: True.
What is loved by the gods is dear to the gods. Love causes that which is loved to be dear to the gods.
Socrates: But, if “that which is holy” is the same with “that which is dear to God” and “is loved because it is holy”, then “that which is dear to God” would have been loved as “being dear to God”; but if that which “is dear to God” is dear to him “because loved by him”, then “that which is holy” would have been holy because loved by him. [11a]
But now you see that the reverse is the case, and that they are quite different from one another. [11b] For one (theophiles) is of a kind to be loved because it is loved, and the other (osion) is loved because it is of a kind to be loved.
The three things concerning an action are:
(A) It is holy
(B) It becomes approved by the gods (C) It is divinely approved |
The distinction between (B) and (C) is that (B) deals with the act of approval by the gods and (C) deals with the state of the action as being approved of by the gods. Socrates' earlier point is meant to indicate that (C) could occur only because of (B), and not the other way around. An action is in the state of being approved of by the gods because the gods decided to approve of it. The reverse, that the gods decide to approve of a deed because it is a deed they approve of, is nonsensical.
66-70
Thus you appear to me, when I ask you what is the essence of holiness, to offer an attribute only, and not the essence-the attribute of being loved by all the gods.
Euthyphro can only provide an attribute, or “a quality or feature regarded as a characteristic or inherent part of something”, not the essence, or “a property of something without which it would not be what it is”, of holiness.
But you still refuse to explain to me the nature of holiness. Therefore, I will ask you not to hide your treasure, but to tell me once more what holiness, or piety, really is. Whether dear to the gods or not (for that is a matter about which we will not quarrel) and what is impiety?
The three claims Euthyphro is committed to are:
(1) an action gets approved by the gods because it is holy
(2) an action is approved of by the gods because it gets approved of by the gods (3) what is holy is what is approved of by the gods |
Therefore, (1) states that if (A) happens, then (B):
(1) an action gets approved by the gods because it is holy
(A) It is holy then (B) It becomes approved by the gods |
(2) states that if (B) happens, then (C) :
(2) an action is approved of by the gods because it gets approved of by the gods
(B) It becomes approved by the gods then (C) It is divinely approved |
and (3) states that (A) equals (C).
(3) What is holy is what is approved of by the gods
(A) It is holy = (C) It is divinely approved |
The problem is that (1) and (2) imply that if (A) then (C), not that (A) equals (C).
(1) an action gets approved by the gods because it is holy
(1) an action gets approved by the gods because it is holy
(A) It is holy
(B) It becomes approved by the gods |
(2) an action is approved of by the gods because it gets approved of by the gods
(B) It becomes approved by the gods
(C) It is divinely approved |
If (A) determines (B) and (B) determines (C), then Euthyphro cannot claim that (A) and (C) are one and the same. Of course, it is possible that (A) and (C) refer to the same action. If everything that is divinely approved gets approved by the gods and if everything that gets approved by the gods is holy, then what is holy and what is divinely approved of are identical.
The point Socrates is making is not that (A) and (C) necessarily refer to different things, but that even if they do refer to the same things, they do not have the same meaning. “It is holy.” and “It is divinely approved” do not mean the same thing, and cannot be said by Euthyphro to be equivalent, even if they refer to exactly the same things.
The point Socrates is making is not that (A) and (C) necessarily refer to different things, but that even if they do refer to the same things, they do not have the same meaning. “It is holy.” and “It is divinely approved” do not mean the same thing, and cannot be said by Euthyphro to be equivalent, even if they refer to exactly the same things.
Euthyphro: I really do not know, Socrates, how to express what I mean. For somehow or other our arguments, on whatever ground we rest them, seem to turn round and walk away from us.
Socrates: Your words are like the handiwork of my ancestor Daedalus and if I were the sayer or propounder of them, you might say that my arguments walk away and will not remain fixed where they are placed because I am a descendant of his. But now, since these notions are your own, you must find some other gibe, for they certainly, as you yourself allow, show an inclination to be on the move.
Euthyphro admits that his ideas show a tendency to move and this inclination for instability is due to premises that, when taken to their reasonable conclusions, demonstrate contradictions.
For example, while the modern idea of describing God as omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent seems emotionally satisfying and well intentioned, however, the result of these of the attributes is disturbing.
There is evil in the world and an all good God cannot allow evil, the conclusion is that he is unaware of evil. But if he is unaware of evil, then he is not omnipresence. However, if he is aware of evil and all good, but cannot prevent evil, then he is not all powerful. If he is omnipotent and aware of evil, but does not prevent evil, then he is not all good. Omnipresence may be a characteristic of God, but the essence of God comprises neither omnipotence nor omnibenevolence.
For example, while the modern idea of describing God as omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent seems emotionally satisfying and well intentioned, however, the result of these of the attributes is disturbing.
There is evil in the world and an all good God cannot allow evil, the conclusion is that he is unaware of evil. But if he is unaware of evil, then he is not omnipresence. However, if he is aware of evil and all good, but cannot prevent evil, then he is not all powerful. If he is omnipotent and aware of evil, but does not prevent evil, then he is not all good. Omnipresence may be a characteristic of God, but the essence of God comprises neither omnipotence nor omnibenevolence.
Euthyphro: Nay, I shall still say that you are the Daedalus who sets arguments in motion; not I, certainly, but you make them move or go round, for they would never have stirred, as far as I am concerned.
If not for Socrates’ repeated inquiries, Euthyphro’s opinions would remain stable, otherwise said, religious ideas cannot withstand scrutiny.
Socrates: Then I must be a greater than Daedalus. For whereas he only made his own inventions move, I move those of other people as well.
The inventions of other people, or poets, that Socrates moves are the opinions concerning the gods, their amazing stories, and Euthyphro’s confused definitions.
71-75
And the beauty of it is that I would rather not. For I would give the wisdom of Daedalus and the wealth of Tantalus to be able to detain them and keep them fixed. But enough of this. As I perceive that you are lazy, I will endeavor to show you how you might instruct me in the nature of piety and I hope that you will not grudge your labor.
Socrates describes Euthyphro as “lazy” whereas possessing “confused thinking” would be more accurate, although not conducive to leading him to the facts of the matter. Socrates attempts to assist Euthyphro in teaching Socrates about the nature of piety.
Tell me, then: Is not that which is pious necessarily just?
Euthyphro: Yes.
Socrates: And is, then, all which is just pious? Or is that which is pious all just, but that which is just, only in part and not all, pious?
Euthyphro: I do not understand you.
Socrates: And yet I know that you are as much wiser than I am, as you are younger. But, as I was saying, the abundance of your wisdom makes you lazy.
The cause of Euthyphro’s laziness, or his inability to apply reason, is suggested to be his “wisdom”.
Please to exert yourself, for there is no real difficulty in understanding me. What I mean I may explain by an illustration of what I do not mean. The poet (Stasinus) sings-
Of Zeus, the author and creator of all these things, |
Now I disagree with this poet. Shall I tell you in what respect?
Euthyphro: By all means.
Socrates: I should not say that where there is fear, there is also reverence. For I am sure that many persons fear poverty, disease, and the like evils, but I do not perceive that they reverence the objects of their fear.
Euthyphro: Very true.
Socrates: But where reverence is, there is fear. For he, who has a feeling of reverence and shame about the commission of any action, fears and is afraid of an ill reputation.
Euthyphro: No doubt.
We suggest Euthyphro has a feeling of shame concerning the death of the servant, as he fears a bad reputation- “No doubt.”
Socrates: Then we are wrong in saying that “where there is fear there is also reverence” and we should say, “where there is reverence there is also fear.” But there is not always reverence where there is fear. For fear is a more extended notion and reverence is a part of fear, just as the odd is a part of number, and number is a more extended notion than the odd. I suppose that you follow me now?
Euthyphro: Quite well.
Reverence comprises a part of fear.
Socrates: That was the sort of question which I meant to raise when I asked whether “the just” is always “the pious”, or “the pious” always “the just” and whether there may not be justice where there is not piety, for justice is the more extended notion of which piety is only a part. Do you dissent?
Euthyphro: No, I think that you are right.
Peity is a part of the concept of justice.
76-80
Socrates: Then, if piety is a part of justice, I suppose that we should inquire what part? If you had pursued the inquiry in the previous cases, for instance, if you had asked me what is an even number and what part of number the even is, I should have had no difficulty in replying: a number which represents a figure having two equal sides. Do you not agree?
Euthyphro: Yes, I agree.
Once again, Socrates uses an example from the physical world.
Socrates: In like manner, I want you to tell me what part of justice is piety, or holiness, that I may be able to tell Meletus not to do me injustice, or indict me for impiety, as I am now adequately instructed by you in the nature of piety, or holiness, and their opposites.
Euthyphro: Piety, or holiness, appears to me to be that part of justice which attends to the gods, as there is the other part of justice which attends to men.
Euthyphro’s concept of justice seems to be applicable either to men or to the gods. We are uncertain if his understanding of justice originates in the natural world or Nature.
Socrates: That is good, yet still there is a little point about which I should like to have further information. What is the meaning of "attention"? For attention can hardly be used in the same sense when applied to the gods as when applied to other things. For instance, horses are said to require attention and not every person is able to attend to them, but only a person skilled in horsemanship. Is it not so?
Euthyphro: Certainly.
Socrates: I should suppose that the art of horsemanship is the art of attending to horses?
Socrates uses an example from the physical world.
Euthyphro: Yes.
Socrates: Nor is everyone qualified to attend to dogs, but only the huntsman?
Euthyphro: True.
Not everyone has equal abilities or natural talents.
Socrates: And I should also conceive that the art of the huntsman is the art of attending to dogs?
Euthyphro: Yes.
Socrates uses a second case from the physical realm.
81-85
Socrates: As the art of the ox herd is the art of attending to oxen?
Euthyphro: Very true.
Socrates: In like manner holiness, or piety, is the art of attending to the gods? That would be your meaning?
Euthyphro: Yes.
Socrates: And is not attention always designed for the good, or benefit, of that to which the attention is given? As in the case of horses, you may observe that when attended to by the horseman's art they are benefited and improved, are they not?
Euthyphro: True.
Socrates gives an instance from Nature.
Socrates: As the dogs are benefited by the huntsman's art, and the oxen by the art of the ox herd, and all other things are tended, or attended, for their good and not for their hurt?
Euthyphro: Certainly, not for their hurt.
Socrates: But for their good?
Euthyphro: Of course.
Socrates uses two examples or cases from reality or the natural world.
Socrates: And does piety, or holiness, which has been defined to be “the art of attending to the gods”, benefit or improve them? Would you say that when you do a holy act you make any of the gods better?
Euthyphro: No, no, that was certainly not what I meant.
Socrates: And I never supposed that you did. I asked you the question about the nature of the attention, because I thought that you did not.
Euthyphro: You do me justice- that is not the sort of attention which I mean.
Once again, Socrates is attempting to assist Euthyphro realize that his opinions concerning the gods and their adventures are in error.
Socrates: Good. But I must still ask what is this attention to the gods which is called piety?
Euthyphro: It is such as servants show to their masters.
Piety is a part of justice and is a certain type or manner of attention to the gods.
Socrates: I understand- a sort of ministration to the gods.
Euthyphro: Exactly.
Socrates: Medicine is also a sort of ministration, or service, having in view the attainment of some object, would you not say of health?
Euthyphro: I should.
Socrates uses an example from the physical world.
86-90
Socrates: Again, there is an art which ministers to the ship-builder with a view to the attainment of some result?
Euthyphro: Yes, with a view to the building of a ship.
Socrates uses a case from reality.
Socrates: As there is an art which ministers to the housebuilder with a view to the building of a house?
Euthyphro: Yes.
Socrates uses an example from reality.
Socrates: And now tell me, about the art which ministers to the gods: what work does that help to accomplish? For you must surely know if, as you say, you are, of all men living, the one who is best instructed in religion.
Euthyphro: And I speak the truth.
Socrates uses conditional phrasing, “if, as you say…” “you must surely know”.
Socrates: Tell me then, tell me: What is that fair work which the gods do by the help of our ministrations?
Euthyphro: Many and fair are the works which they do.
“Many and fair” and vague.
Socrates: And so are those of a general. But the chief of them is easily told. Would you not say that victory in war is the chief of them?
Euthyphro: Certainly.
Socrates gives an example from the physical realm.
91-95
Socrates: Many and fair, too, are the works of the husbandman, if I am not mistaken, but his chief work is the production of food from the earth?
Euthyphro: Exactly.
Socrates provides an example from reality.
Socrates: And of the many and fair things done by the gods, which is the chief, or principal, one?
Euthyphro: I have already told you that to accurately learn all these things will be very tiresome. Let me simply say that piety or holiness is “earning how to please the gods in word and deed”, by prayers and sacrifices. Such piety is the salvation of families and states, just as the impious, which is unpleasing to the gods, is their ruin and destruction.
Euthyphro does not define piety or holiness as pleasing the gods in word and deed, but as “learning how to please the gods”. Piety is a type of submission through words (prayers) and deeds (sacrifices).
Socrates: If you had chosen,I think that you could have answered in much fewer words the chief question which I asked. But I see plainly that you are not disposed to instruct me- clearly not: else why, when we reached the point, did you turn aside? [14c] Had you only answered me, by this time I should have truly learned of you the nature of piety.
If Euthyphro would have answered Socrates’ questions, then Socrates “should have” learned the essence of piety.
Now, as the asker of a question is necessarily dependent on the answerer, whither he leads- I must follow and can only ask again, what is the pious, and what is piety?
Socrates places the reason for his inability to learn the nature of piety upon Euthyphro’s inadequate responses.
Do you mean that they are a sort of science of praying and sacrificing?
Euthyphro: Yes, I do.
Socrates: And sacrificing is giving to the gods and prayer is asking of the gods? [14d]
Euthyphro: Yes.
Socrates: Upon this view, then piety is a science of asking and giving?
Euthyphro: You understand me capitally.
Once again, Socrates understands Euthyphro’s explanation, not concerning the essence of piety, but of a characteristic of piety. In this example, Socrates learns that a “science” exists of asking of and giving to the gods.
96-100
Socrates: Yes, the reason is that I am a votary of your science, give my mind to it, and, therefore, nothing which you say will be thrown away upon me. Then please tell me: What is the nature of this service to the gods? Do you mean that we prefer requests and give gifts to them?
Euthyphro: Yes, I do.
Socrates’ wording of “we prefer requests” suggests an indifferent to what the gods prefer, just as Socrates has no preference, except for the truth.
Socrates: Is not the right way of asking to ask of them what we want?
Euthyphro: Certainly.
An aspect of the science of asking is to ask the gods what we want from them.
Socrates: And the right way of giving is to give to them in return [14e] what they want of us. There would be no meaning in an art which gives to anyone that which he does not want.
Euthyphro: Very true.
Socrates: Then piety is an art which gods and men have of doing business with one another?
Euthyphro: That is an expression which you may use, if you like.
Socrates: But I have no particular liking for anything but the truth. However, I wish that you would tell me what benefit accrues from our gifts to the gods.
Socrates does not have a “feeling of fondness” for anything but the truth. Of course, the truth, or facts, are not emotionally satisfying.
There is no doubt about what they give to us; for there is no good thing which they do not give; but how we can give any good thing to them in return is far from being equally clear. [15a]
Although Socrates states there is no doubt about what the gods give us, the reality is that there is considerable doubt concerning what, if anything, we receive from the gods. The wording that all good things are due to the gods is a concession to Euthyphro's limited understanding which is echoed in the first chapter of the Epistle of Saint James "Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above..."
If they give everything and we give nothing, that must be an affair of business in which we have very greatly the advantage of them.
Socrates’ impious statement is that we mortals have a the gods at a permanent disadvantage, as we receive everything from them and give them “nothing” but “gifts”.
101-104
Euthyphro: And do you imagine that any benefit accrues to the gods from our gifts?
Socrates: But if not, what is the meaning of gifts which are conferred by us upon the gods?
Socrates wonders: “If the gods do not benefit by our sacrifices, then why do we offer sacrifices?”
Euthyphro: What else, but tributes of honor, and, as I was just now saying, what pleases them? [15b]
Socrates: Then piety is pleasing to the gods, but not beneficial, or dear, to them?
Euthyphro: I should say that nothing could be dearer.
Socrates: Then once more, the assertion is repeated that piety is dear to the gods?
Euthyphro: Certainly.
Socrates: And when you say this, can you wonder at your words not standing firm, but walking away? Will you accuse me of being the Daedalus who makes them walk away, not perceiving that there is another, and far greater, artist than Daedalus who makes them go round in a circle, and he is yourself. For the argument, as you will perceive, comes round to the same point. Were we not saying that the holy, or pious, was not the same with that which is loved of the gods? Have you forgotten?
Euthyphro: I quite remember.
Socrates: And are you not saying that “what is loved of the gods” is holy and is not this the same as “what is dear to them”. Do you see?
Euthyphro: True.
Socrates: Then either we were wrong in former assertion or, if we were right then, we are wrong now.
Euthyphro: One of the two must be true.
Socrates: Then we must begin again and ask, What is piety? That is an inquiry which I shall never be weary of pursuing as far as in me lies and I entreat you not to scorn me, but to apply your mind to the utmost, and tell me the truth. [15d]
Once again, Socrates does not seek what is “likeable”, agreeable, or pleasing, but the truth.
For, if any man knows, you are he and therefore I must detain you, like Proteus, until you tell.
If you had not certainly known the nature of piety and impiety, I am confident that you would never, on behalf of a serf, have charged your aged father with murder. You would not have run such a risk of doing wrong in the sight of the gods, and you would have had too much respect for the opinions of men.
Socrates continues to hint that Euthyphro does not know the nature, or essence, of either piety or impiety. Euthyphro is concerned about or respects the “opinions of men”, otherwise he would not have brought public attention to his father’s actions.
Therefore, I am sure that you know the nature of piety and impiety. Then speak out and do not hide your knowledge.
Euthyphro: Another time, for I am in a hurry and must go now.
Socrates: Alas! My companion and will you leave me in despair? I was hoping that you would instruct me in the nature of piety and impiety, then I might have cleared myself of Meletus and his indictment. [16a] I would have told him that I had been enlightened by Euthyphro, and had given up rash innovations and speculations, in which I indulged only through ignorance, and that now I am about to lead a better life.
Socrates describes his life as a philosopher in terms of being “rash”, or displaying a lack of careful consideration of the possible consequences of an action, “innovations and speculations”. Due to Socrates natural skepticism, speculation or “forming conjecture without firm evidence” is the domain of the “common herd”. If Socrates could learn from Euthyphro the nature of piety and impiety, then he could “lead a better life”. The implication is that a better life can be found through opinions of others, but not through one’s own proper reasoning.
In conclusion, the Gentle Reader is in a position to answer the rhetorical question "Whose bias do y'all seek?"
In conclusion, the Gentle Reader is in a position to answer the rhetorical question "Whose bias do y'all seek?"
various greek words
Since Euthyphro demonstrated difficulties answering Socrates questions, we wondered if the cause might not be subject itself, but the Greek language. Therefore, we researched appropriate words in the King James Bible with the expectation that sixteenth century scholars and editors would have a more complete understanding than Euthyphro. The following information is courtesy of the Blue Letter Bible from the King James Version of the Bible (KJV).
Strong's Number G4576 σέβω
σέβομαι sébomai, middle voice of an apparently primary verb; to revere, i.e. adore. The KJV translates the ten occurrences of Strong's G4576 as worship (6x), devout (3x), and religious (once).
Strong's Number G2152 εὐσεβής
Strong's Number G2152 εὐσεβής
εὐσεβής eusebḗs, from εὖ (G2095) and σέβω (G4576), well-reverent, i.e. pious. The KJV translates the four occurrences of Strong's G2152 as devout (3x) and godly (once).
Strong's Number G2150 εὐσέβεια
Strong's Number G2150 εὐσέβεια
εὐσέβεια eusébeia, from G2152; piety; specially, the gospel scheme. The KJV translates the fourteen occurrences of Strong's G2150 as godliness (14x) and holiness (once).
Clearly "godliness" is not synonymous as "holiness".
Clearly "godliness" is not synonymous as "holiness".
Strong's Number G40 ἅγιος
Strong's Number G40 ἅγιος
ἅγιος hágios, from ἅγος hágos (an awful thing) (compare G53, G2282); sacred (physically, pure, morally blameless or religious, ceremonially, consecrated). The KJV translates the 229 occurrences of Strong's Number G40 as holy (161x), saints (61x), Holy One (4x), and miscellaneous (3x).
The editors have difficulty translating the word "hagios", at times it is an adjective, "holy", and other times it refers to a group of people, "saints". The editors have used "saints", derived from the Latin, although they could have been consistent in translating the word as "holy ones" or "holy people".
The editors have difficulty translating the word "hagios", at times it is an adjective, "holy", and other times it refers to a group of people, "saints". The editors have used "saints", derived from the Latin, although they could have been consistent in translating the word as "holy ones" or "holy people".
Strong's Number G53 ἁγνός
ἁγνός hagnós, from the same as G40; properly, clean, i.e. (figuratively) innocent, modest, perfect. The KJV translates the eight occurrences of Strong's Number G53 as pure (4x), chaste (3x), and clear (once).
Strong's Number G2282 θάλπω
θάλπω thálpō, probably akin to θάλλω thállō (to warm); to brood, i.e. (figuratively) to foster. The KJV translates both occurrences of Strong's Number G2282 as cherish.
Strong's Number G3741ὅσιος
ὅσιος hósios, of uncertain affinity; properly, right (by intrinsic or divine character; thus distinguished from G1342, which refers rather to human statutes and relations; from G2413, which denotes formal consecration; and from G40, which relates to purity from defilement), i.e. hallowed (pious, sacred, sure). The KJV translates eight occurrences of Strong's Number G3741 as holy (4x), Holy One (2x), mercies (once), and shall be (once).
The editors had difficulties with the word "hosios", as there is a difference between "holy" and "Holy One".
The editors had difficulties with the word "hosios", as there is a difference between "holy" and "Holy One".
Strong's Number G2413 ἱερός
ἱερός hierós, of uncertain affinity; sacred. The KJV translates both occurrences of Strong's Number G2413 as holy.
Strong's Number G1342 δίκαιος
δίκαιος díkaios, from G1349; equitable (in character or act); by implication, innocent, holy (absolutely or relatively). The KJV translates 81 occurrences of Strong's Number G1342 as righteous (41x), just (33x), right (5x), and meet (twice).